Well Europe is Busy Signing their SOVEREIGNTY away. No turning back contracts! Say goodbye to Sovereignty!!

Below this Article you can see the Countries and how they voted 

23 out of 27 EU member states had completed their ratification, as of 27 September 2012

It is still going through many judicial systems as it is an odvious total violation of sovereignty .  The whole scheme is brought in as a solution to the Austerity debt mechanism. Rothschild through Wallstreet gives Europe a Dirivative debt problem Private debt passes to public debt  and balloons to an enormous burden that all european political hacks are willing to lose everything even their futures sovereignty (criminals!)and give over CENTRAL control to whom else ROTHSCHILD I must admit Bankers are brilliant They create the problem then they offer them the solution. Will the People submit to this SHAM that their criminal PUPPET Politicians have just sold them, down the river with . This is what we will see. But if the Example being our on own (USA) FEDERAL RESERVE as an example. They have a lot of dark days ahead.

ESM, a coup d’état in 17 countries!   NOW23 of 27!!! Sept. 28 2012.

by Rudo de Ruijter
17 October 2011
with important update of 6 February 2012
Preliminary message to Parliamentarians.

What is special in this ESM-treaty? The Ministers of Finance get a new part-time function as Governors of the ESM. The national parliaments have no authority over their Minister of Finance, when the latter acts as Governors of the ESM. The Governors freely dispose of the State’s Vaults. No veto-right has been foreseen for the national parliaments. Ratifying this treaty is the death of the sovereign democracies of the eurozone.

(And if you are not a Parliamentarian, make sure your Parliamentarians get this message, for otherwise they will give the key of democracy to the devil without even being aware of it!)

As indicated in the precedent article “ESM, the new European dictator” , the Ministers of Finance of the 17 euro-countries, on July 11th 2011, have signed a Treaty for the Establishment of the European Stability Mechanism. Its purpose it to make the citizens pay for the hundreds of billions of euros that are pumped into the rescue funds to save the euro and to get the national parliaments in a strangle hold.

The signature was not noticed by the international press. Many journalists still confuse this new ESM-treaty with its (illegal) predecessors, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). De EFSF now has a lending capacity of 440 billion euros. (1.000 billion since 27 October 2011.) The ESM is without limit.

At the moment of writing this treaty still has to be ratified by the national parliaments in all 17 countries, except if such has already taken place silently here and there.

For a short introduction in the ESM-treaty you can view this 3.5 minutes video on YouTube:

ESM, a coup d’état in 17 countries!

If by coup d’état we understand a seizure of the real power and a limitation of the power of the democratically chosen parliament, then this ESM-treaty is a coup d’état in 17 countries simultaneously.

This is completely in line with the philosophy of the European Commission, which, according to its President Barroso, must be “the economic government of the Union, that defines the actions that governments have to execute.” (28 Spetember 2011) [1]

The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is not that much a mechanism, but rather a new administration of the European Union (EU). The reported goal is to supply loans (under strict conditions) to euro-countries, which cannot fulfil their financial obligations. It takes over the tasks of the aforementioned EFSF and EFSM. It is ruled by a Board of Governors. These are the 17 Ministers of Finance of the euro-countries within the EU.

The ESM treaty says in article 8, that this administration gets a social capital of 700 billion euros. Then, in article 10 it says that the Board of Governors may decide to change this amount and adapt article 8 accordingly. In article 9 it says the Board of Governors may claim unpaid social capital from the member countries at all times (to be paid within 7 days.) So in fact it says the ESM can claim money without limits from the member countries. The treaty does not foresee any right of veto for the national parliaments.

Unanimous

According to article 5.6 the Board of Governors must take the decisions above unanimously. So the entire board must vote “yes”.

At first glance, it is very curious that the whole treaty stands or falls with the unanimity of the 17 Ministers of Finance of the euro-countries. When you see how many difficulties they have to overcome for an agreement to be reached over freeing up the loans already promised to Greece, you would not expect that the EU would build a treaty that starts from the view that this unanimity does exist or at least can be achieved.

The eurozone is a colourful reflexion of the diversity of Europe: the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Germany and France and also Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Malta, Greece, Austria, Slovakia, Slovenia and finally Estonia and Finland. The 17 Ministers form, in fact, a colourful company too. Each of them represents a country with different interests. And they expect unanimity from them? How is that possible?

To understand, we must look a bit further. It is true, in the ESM the 17 ministers vote on all important decisions, but there are still other people who are present at their meetings, officially as “observers”. Wy would these ministers need observers? To check if they do what they are expected to do?

There are three observers:

•the member of the European Commission in charge of economic and monetary affairs,
•the President of the Euro Group (the informal club of the 17 Ministers of Finance)
•the President of the European Central Bank! [2]
So, if we can’t expect these 17 Ministers of Finance to be unanimous spontaneously, it must be the influence of these observers that achieves it. To understand which influence the European Commission and the ECB can exercise on our ministers, let’s take a closer look.

Who are Ministers of Finance?

Well, generally, these are people who come and go. Most of the time they are appointed after the national parlementarian elections, that are initially followed by the bargaining of the coalition discussions and then by the tugging for filling in the most important portfolios, like the Interior Ministry, Economic Affairs and Finance. In the favorable case they have the capacities to lead a ministry. Such a person can lead the Ministry of Defense at one time and be appointed Minister of Education or Social Affairs some other time. Knowledge of matters is considered to be less relevant as managing capacities.

Economy is not Finance

This way, at the moment, we have in the Netherlands a Minister of Finance, Jan Kees de Jager, loaded to the brim with Economic diplomas, but who initially did not show he had any understanding of finance. One of his first ideas was to propose a law that should forbid people to call for a run on the bank. Jan Kees, banks have no money! For each euro the customers of ING (the biggest Dutch bank) have in their account, the bank only has 3 cents. You don’t expect people to line up for so little? And furthermore, as long as the central bank does not want a bank to fall, the latter can easily survive a run on the bank with borrowed money.

Freshly appointed Ministers of Finance are, generally, extremely happy they have so much success in their career, but they arrive in a world they hardly know or don’t know at all. That is the self-inportant little world of international financial institutions and the world of figures with an endless number of zeros. A little moment of inattention and you are mistaken by douzens of billions. (That happened to Dutch Prime Minister Rutte and Jan Kees de Jager when they informed Parliament after a European meeting about Greece. [3] ) These new ministers are an easy prey for the counsellors of the ECB and the IMF, who come to explain how things work and what a good Minister of Finance ought to do.

As far as these Ministers of Finance have a basic knowledge in economics, they should know that the whole euro-experiment is deemed to fail. That was already known at the start in 1970, but bankers and opinionated politicians pushed the shared currency forward. The point is that a unique currency can only work in a economically homogeneous area. [4] [5] [6] Here is why.

The prison of the fixed exchange rates

When consumers, in countries with less possibilities for productivity, prefer cheaper and better products from abroad, the external debt will increase. At the same time the internal productivity decreases. A country that has its own currency, can devaluate its currency then. That makes imported products more expensive for its own population and makes exported products cheaper for foreign purchasers. The debt will decrease and the productivity will increase again. Devaluations were very common before the euro started. The euro works as a fixed exchange rate. Less productive countries are like rats in a trap. They will never be able to get out of debts again. That is why, the chosen method to load still higher debts on these countries is strange and ill-disposed.

Long live the free capital market!

We should not forget these countries did not have big and insurmountable problems when they entered the euro-zone. Otherwise, they would not have been accepted. The problems arose, because with their admission in the eurozone, the free circulation of capital became a fact too. Banks from existing euro-countries came on a massive scale to supply cheap loans to the new euro-citizens. And because, with a same capital, banks are allowed to lend out twice as much for mortgages than for other types of loans, they mainly financed housing. However, the bankers forgot, that people don’t need just a roof above their head, but they also need income to pay back the loans. So the bankers should have financed sufficient economic activities too. But that did not happen. This way, a first wave of new euro-citizens became indebted without possibilities to pay back their debts. The real estate market crashed. The entrepreneurs and their suppliers went broke, leaving behind a desolate scene of empty and unfinished housing quarters.

The problematic euro-rules

More over, countries were labelled “problem countries”, exclusively because they could not meet the artificially set demands for the euro-zone anymore, that is to say a maximum budget deficit of 3% of their BIP and a maximum debt of 60% of the BIP. [7] Normally, it is not a problem for a country when the debt is twice as high, when, for instance, it is counterbalanced by possessions like in Greece. And a shortage on the budget of over 3% does not need to be a problem for a country either. In fact, the only problem was, that the set limits for the euro-zone turned out to be irrealistic and virtually no member country could meet them. You could also say, that those who had established these unfeasible exigences were dumbos, as well as the ministers who promised they would respect them. Anyway, it is a simple way to create a crisis.

Black sheep

Because nearly all countries had surpassed the set limits, it was important to divert the attention and point gaudily in the direction of the naughtiest boy in the classroom. For Greece, these officials even created a complete defamation campaign, in which lying Dutch politicians also cheerfully participated. Greece would have hidden its debt [8], and the Greeks were lazy and retired early etc. [9] Rapidly Greece came under attack and had to pay ever higher interest for its loans. Fortunately its euro-class friends wanted to help. Jan Kees even promised we would earn money on it.

Money is power

Once you have manoeuvered your victim into trouble – again, Greece did not have insurmountable problems when it became member of the eurozone – you can apply the politics of the carrot and the stick: “We will supply loans, but under condition that…” The IMF has half a century of experience with this kind of abuse of power and has applied this politic mischievously in many developing countries. First the country is overloaded with loans, so as it isn’t even able to pay the interest. The loans are provided for specific projects. Most often they are executed by foreign companies. They receive the money from the loans. The country stays with the debts. Further more everything the country has of value is sold to foreign investors. And of course the government has to cut its expenses to the bones and the population must bleed, so they know the IMF has the power.

Seizure of power of the European Commission

Although, according to article 122.2 of the TFEU [10] the European Council can offer financial help to countries in difficulties (on proposal of the European Commission), the wolfs of the European Commission could not resist the temptation to establish their own IMF, or more exactly, a European brother, that would closely cooperate with the IMF.

They got it off the ground in May and June 2010, the EFSM and the EFSF. They have a temporary character and juridical defaults. The loan capacity of the EFSF has recently been increased to 1,000 billion euros (that represents 3,300 per euro-citizen) and its role has been extended to save the banks too.

Their successor is the ESM. It has been signed on 11 July 2011 and awaits ratification by the national parliaments. The ESM gets a permanent character and the power to claim unlimited money from the States’ Vaults and lend it out at cost and risk of the eurocitizens. They are to start with a social capital of 700 billion (2100 per euro-citizen), but they are already speaking about an increase to 1.5 to 2 trillion that they think they will need.

Amendment of article 136

The ESM is based on an amendment of article 136 of the TFEU of 23 March 2011 [11], wich, in fact, contains an extension of the competences of the EU, since this amendment allows for the establishment of administrations that limit the power of national parliaments. And because this amendment is based on article 48.6 of the Treaty of Europe, this is an illegal construction. [12] In Brussels they don’t care about that and, similarly, the national parliaments don’t think the transgression of the democratic rules is that important. For the consequence would be, that the population would first have to vote about the extension of competences of Brussels. And that stupid population would surely vote against it!

The ESM gets the power to empty the States’ Vaults without the Parliaments being able to stop them. Moreover the amendment – strictly according to its text – enables the establishment of all kinds of anti-democratic administrations, which under pretext to fight the instability in the eurozone can limit the effects of national legislation and can limit civil rights.

Shock and awe

Create a crisis and seize power. At the moment a country is totally disrupted, you can shape things the way you want. It is a violent scenario the advocates of the free market economy have applied for decades in many countries like England, Poland, China, South-Africa, Russia and the US. I refer to one of the most reveiling books of our time: The Shock Doctrine of Naomie Klein (available in many languages, a must-read.)

Now it is Greece’s turn. The defamation has done its work. The citizens in the other euro-countries hardly protest, and when they do, it is mainly because of the possible loss of their money, that their pension funds have invested there. But if they would think a little bit further, they would understand that they too are manoeuvered into debts by the rescue funds and can be the next victims tomorrow. That can happen from one day to the next, announced by a newspaper title like “ING-bank may fail”…

Vicious circle

In the meantime, in the panic of this manufactured crisis, parliaments accept urgency measures they did not even consider the day before. Now, with the money from the urgency funds banks must be saved too. In the Netherlands they agreed with that on 6 October 2011 (the Socialist Party voted against it), Slovakia was the last to agree with the EFSF-expansion on 13 October 2011, after using the issue to dismiss the government.

So now we have a vicious circle: the banks cause the problems, they may profit directly and indirectly from the loans of the emergency measures, and they may lend out still more recklessly, for possible losses will be paid by the euro-citizens.

Away with unanimous decision making

Back to the ESM. That treaty stands or falls with the unanimity of the 17 Ministers of Finance. The European Commission and the European Central bank are confident they have enough influence to get the 17 noses in the same direction.

Well, to be exact, 17 is not really necessary. A decision is also valid when not all ministers are present. Each minister represents a number of votes, related to the number of shares his country has in the ESM. (See annexe below this article.) When 2/3 of the ministers with 2/3 of the votes are present, a ballot can be held validly. And when ministers who are present for the vote, don’t vote, that still counts as a unanimous decision. As long as nobody actually votes against it.

In theory, a hard headed minister of a small country could block the whole proces. (He must be very daring.) Barroso does not want that anymore. He wants all the European Treaties to be changed in order to abolish the unanimous decision making process. For the ESM that would mean that if Germany, France, Italy and a smaller country like the Netherlands agree with each other, the 13 other countries have nothing more to say. Long live the dictatorship in Brussels! Long live the EU!

Inviolability

We are already used to the fact that administrators and representatives of the people do not want to answer for their words and deeds. But at the ESM they exaggerate this to the extreme. The rules are set in a way, that everyone who works there can do or not do anything he likes, without having to answer for it to parliaments, administrations or judges! At the utmost a Minsiter of Finance can be replaced by another, who will immediately enjoy the same excessive privileges. A criminal could not wish a better den.

A final thought

The European Union has the free market economy as laid down principle. Meanwhile, almost everybody has understood that deregulation of banks, privatizations of infrastructures and the abolition of governmental functions lead to a harsh society, plagued by crises. These principles are outdated. The advocates of these principles will only be able to push them forward with violence. Greece won’t be the last victime.

Annexe

Repartition of the votes among the Governors of the ESM according to the numbers of shares the member coountries detain.

Subscriptions to the authorised capital stock

ESM Member
Number of shares
Capital subscription (EUR)

Kingdom of Belgium 243 397
24 339 700 000

Federal Republic of Germany 1 900 248
190 024 800 000

Republic of Estonia 13 020
1 302 000 000

Ireland 111 454
11 145 400 000

Hellenic Republic 197 169
19 716 900 000

Kingdom of Spain 833 259
83 325 900 000

French Republic 1 427 013
142 701 300 000

Italian Republic 1 253 959
125 395 900 000

Republic of Cyprus 13 734
1 373 400 000

Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 17 528
1 752 800 000

Malta 5 117
511 700 000

Kingdom of the Netherlands 400 190
40 019 000 000

Republic of Austria 194 838
19 483 800 000

Portuguese Republic 175 644
17 564 400 000

Republic of Slovenia 29 932
2 993 200 000

Slovak Republic 57 680
5 768 000 000

Republic of Finland 125 818
12 581 800 000

Total 7 000 000
700 000 000 000

Sources and references

[1] Barroso, 28 September 2011 http://euobserver.com/19/113760

[2] Officially, the European Central bank is not an organ of the European Union.* The ECB is the property of the central banks of the euro-countries. In turn, they are independent from the national governments in the sense that they do not take orders from them. They are ruled by a board of private persons. So the euro does not belong to the EU, neither to the national governments, but to a cartel of private bankers, the ECB in Franckfurt, the town of the Rothschild. The EU cannot give any order to the ECB, but inversily the ECB has power within the EU. It governs the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), which is an EU organ. The ECB, together with the central banks of the eurozone, are the members of this ESCB. How complicated do they have to make it to integrate a private company as an official organ with the power of an official organ?

* http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/expert/displayFtu.do?id=73&ftuId=FTU_5.2.html&language=en

[3] Vrijspreker 22 July 2011 *

The Dutch government and the European Commission contradict each other about the size of the new support package for Greece. According to the Ministry of Finance the amount is 109 billion euros, of which 50 billion will come from the banks and other financial institutions. According to the European Commission the governments contribute 109 billion euros and on top of it 50 billion will come from private institutions. The Dutch central bank doesn’t know: “We too, we are very curious to know what has been decided”, a spokesman of the DNB says. The European Central Bank refers to the European Commission.

* http://www.vrijspreker.nl/wp/2011/07/eu-euro-reddingsactie-geklungel/

[4] In the studies about optimum currency areas we can distinguish those focusing on the needed conditions and those from after 1970 (when politicians had decided they wanted a single currency in Europe) focusing on cost and benefits.

Roman Horvath and Lubos Komarek in “OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY: AN APPROACH FOR THINKING ABOUT MONETARY INTEGRATION” (2002)

“It is possible to distinguish two major streams of the optimum currency area literature. The first stream tries to find the crucial economic characteristics to determine where the (illusionary) borders for exchange rates should be drawn (1960s-1970s). The second stream (1970s-till now) assumes that any single country fulfills completely the requirements to make it an optimal member of a monetary union. As a result, the second approach does not continue in the search for characteristics, identified as important for choosing the participants in an optimum currency area. This literature focuses on studying the costs and the benefits to a country intending to participate in a currency area.”

http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1539/1/WRAP_Horvath_twerp647.pdf , page 7.

Friedman put forward the advantages of flexible exchange rates between countries as follows: As it is commonly observed, the country’s prices and wages are relatively rigid and factors are immobile among the countries. As a result, under the negative demand or supply shock the only instrument to avoid higher inflation or unemployment is the change in the flexible exchange rate (that means appreciation or depreciation of the currency). This brings the economy back to the initial external and internal equilibrium. (…) Under the fixed exchange rate regime there would always be the unpleasant impact on unemployment or inflation.

http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1539/1/WRAP_Horvath_twerp647.pdf , page 8.

[5] Yrd. Doç. Dr. Hüseyin Mualla YÜCEOL, Mersin Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Maliye Bölümü, in “WHY THE EUROPEAN UNION IS NOT AN OPTIMAL CURRENCY AREA: THE LIMITS OF INTEGRATION”

Europe is not an optimal currency area. Although, On January 1, 1999, 11 EU countries initiated an EMU by adopting common currency, the euro, the EU does not appear to satisfy all of the criteria for an optimum currency area. Then, joining the EU is not identical with joining the euro for both old members and new members.

http://eab.ege.edu.tr/pdf/6_2/C6-S2-M6.pdf , page 66

[6] Paul de Grauwe, excerpts of speech

“Med upp till tjugosju medlemmar i stället för de nuvarande tolv, kommer utmaningen för att säkerställa ett väl fungerande utvidgat euroområdet, att vara avskräckande. Skälet är, att i en sådan stor grupp, kommer sannolikheten för det som ekonomer kallar “asymmetriska chocker”, att bli avsevärt högre. Detta innebär att vissa länder kan uppleva högkonjunktur och inflationstryck, samtidigt som andra upplever deflationpåverkan. Om alltför många asymmetriska chocker inträffar, kommer ECB att bli paralyserad, utan möjlighet att veta om de skall öka eller minska räntorna. Som ett resultat kommer ofta medlemsländer att känna sig frustrerade med ECB:s politik, som inte tar (och inte kan ta) hänsyn till de enskilda medlemsländernas olika ekonomiska förutsättningar. Detta leder oss till frågan, huruvida det utvidgade EMU, faktiskt kommer att utgöra ett optimalt valutaområde. “(…)

“Om ett land drabbas av negativa chocker till följd av hopgyttringseffekter, kommer de lönsänkningar som är nödvändiga för att hantera dessa störningar, oundvikligen att bli mycket stora. För att ge ett exempel: Om Ford Motor planerar att stänga en fabrik i Belgien, för att istället investera i Polen, så skulle den nödvändiga lönesänkningen för belgiska arbetare behöva ligga på 50% eller mer, för att övertyga Ford om att inte genomföra planen. Med tanke på att en sådan lönesänkning inte är genomförbar, blir det istället flexibilitet som får diktera de belgiska arbetarnas villighet att flytta.”

http://mostlyeconomics.wordpress.com/2010/06/21/were-europes-curent-problems-never-imagined/

[7] Dessa är kraven i Stabilitets- Och Tillväxt Pakten.

[8] Nikolaos Salavrakos, ledamot av Europaparlamentet, i “Finns det en väg ut?”

http://www.efdgroup.eu/news/99-the-greek-fiscal-crisis-is-there-a-way-out.html

[9] OECD: s statistik

http://www.oecd.org/document/47/0,3343,en_2649_34747_39371887_1_1_1_1,00.html

[10] Article 122.2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union:

“Where a Member State is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused
by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control, the Council, on a proposal from the
Commission, may grant, under certain conditions, Union financial assistance to the Member State
concerned. (…)”

[11] European Parliament resolution of 23 March 2011 on the draft European Council
decision amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-0103+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN

[12] art 48.6 Treaty of the European Union

eur-lex.europa.eu

Update 6 February 2012

As was the case for the first version of the ESM-treaty of 11 July 2011, the press has apparently decided that the public should not be informed about the new version of this treaty signed 2 February 2012.

Treaty on the Establishment of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)

http://www.european-council.europa.eu/eurozone-governance/esm-treaty-signature

A big difference with the first version is that the signatories oblige themselves to pay, but in order to get a loan when they ask for it, they must also sign another treaty, that is not ready yet, the TREATY ON STABILITY, COORDINATION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION.

http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/579087/treaty.pdf

This associated treaty will transfer many more powers to Brussels.

The ESM treaty must still be ratified by the national parliaments before taking effect on 1 July 2012, if the countries representing at least 90% of the shares have ratified it by then. As the press keeps silent on this treaty, it will be difficult to have public debates on the usefulness and consequences of the ESM, like the transfer of parliamentarian and ministerial powers to the ESM.

english:

http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582311/05-tesm2.en12.pdf (if unavailable, here a copy)

short video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rxMOW94V6xQ

spanish:

http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582869/01-tesm2.es12.pdf (if unavailable, here a copy)

short video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A9zrxk9N4e4

german:

http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582866/02-tesm2.de12.pdf (if unavailable, here a copy)

Short video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6JKlbbvcu0

estonian:

http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582876/03-tesm2.et12.pdf (if unavailable, here a copy)

greek:

http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582879/04-tesm2.el12.pdf (if unavailable, here a copy)

french:

http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582863/06-tesm2.fr12.pdf (if unavailable, here a copy)

short video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rFTbIGahzhU

irish:

http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582886/07-tesm2.ga12.pdf (if unavailable, here a copy)

italian:

http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582889/08-tesm2.it12.pdf (if unavailable, here a copy)

short video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D0YM-2r8mcA

maltese:

http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582892/09-tesm2.mt12.pdf (if unavailable, here a copy)

dutch:

http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582895/10-tesm2.nl12.pdf (if unavailable, here a copy)

Short video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1GaH2MqXfxM

portuguese:

http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582898/11-tesm2.pt12.pdf (if unavailable, here a copy)

Short video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EIHC34exwZ4

slovak:

http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582901/12-tesm2.sk12.pdf (if unavailable, here a copy)

slovenian:

http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582908/13-tesm2.sl12.pdf (if unavailable, here a copy)

finnish:

http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582911/14-tesm2.fi12.pdf (if unavailable, here a copy)

swedish:

http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582914/15-tesm2.sv12.pdf (if unavailable, here a copy)

Short video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=myzgAHVBg_s

bulgarian, short video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0RbVSPIFsI8

russian, short video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G50-slShDKs

HOW DID THEY VOTE:

Ratification of TFEU Article 136 amendment

23 out of 27 EU member states had completed their ratification, as of 27 September 2012.[14]

Signatory Conclusion
date
Institution Majority
needed[15]
In favour Against AB Deposited[14] Ref.
 Austria 6 July 2012 Federal Council 66.7%       30 July 2012 [16]
4 July 2012 National Council 66.7%       [16]
17 July 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [15]
 Belgium 10 May 2012 Senate 50% 54 4 2 16 July 2012 [17]
14 June 2012 Chamber of Representatives 50% 110 14 2 [17]
9 July 2012 Royal Assent Granted [17]
 Bulgaria1 13 July 2012 National Assembly 50%       6 August 2012 [15]
 Cyprus 30 May 2012 House of Representatives 50%       3 July 2012 [16]
22 June 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [15]
 Czech Republic1 25 April 2012 Senate 60% (absolute)[16] 49 9 N/A   [16]
5 June 2012 Chamber of Deputies 60% (absolute)[16] 140 18 31 [16]
  Presidential Assent   [18][19]
 Denmark1 23 February 2012 Folketing 50% 82 21 5 7 May 2012 [20]
21 March 2012 Royal Assent Granted [21]
 Estonia 8 August 2012 Riigikogu 50%       7 September 2012 [22]
14 August 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [22]
 Finland 9 May 2012 Parliament 50%       29 May 2012 [15]
25 May 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [15]
 France 28 February 2012 Senate 50% 168 27 N/A 2 April 2012 [16]
21 February 2012 National Assembly 50%       [16]
8 March 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [15]
 Germany 29 June 2012 Bundesrat 66.7% 65 0 4 27 September 2012 [16][23]
29 June 2012 Bundestag 66.7% 504 97 1 [16][24]
13 September 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [25]
 Greece 28 March 2012 Parliament 50% 194 59 N/A 17 April 2012 [16]
 Hungary1 27 February 2012 National Assembly 66.7%       19 April 2012 [16]
6 March 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [15]
 Ireland 27 June 2012 Senate 50% Passed 1 August 2012 [26]
19 June 2012 Dáil 50% Passed [27]
3 July 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [28]
 Italy 12 July 2012 Senate 50% 230 22 14 25 September 2012 [15]
19 July 2012 Chamber of Deputies 50% 380 59 36 [15]
23 July 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [29]
 Latvia1 19 April 2012 Parliament 50% 79 0 0 24 May 2012 [16]
9 May 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [15]
 Lithuania1 12 June 2012 Seimas 50% (if abs. > 40%)       6 July 2012 [16]
21 June 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [15]
 Luxembourg 26 June 2012 Chamber of Deputies 66.7%       24 July 2012 [16]
5 July 2012 Royal Assent Granted [15]
 Malta   House of Representatives 50%         [30][31]
 Netherlands 3 July 2012 Senate 50% 50 23 N/A 20 September 2012 [16]
24 May 2012 House of Representatives 50% 100 46 N/A [16]
13 September 2012 Royal Assent Granted [32]
 Poland1 30 May 2012 Senate 50% 55 30 N/A   [16]
11 May 2012 House of Representatives 50% 294 155 1 [33][34]
26 June 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [34][35]
 Portugal 9 December 2011 Assembly 50%       6 February 2012 [15]
2 February 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [15]
 Romania1 12 June 2012 Senate 66.7% (absolute)[36][37] 307 1 0 11 July 2012 [38]
House of Representatives
19 June 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [39]
 Slovakia 15 May 2012 National Council 60% (absolute)[16] 130 11 1 13 June 2012 [16]
9 July 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [40]
 Slovenia July 2011 National Assembly 50%       17 October 2011 [16]
22 August 2011 Presidential Assent Granted [15]
 Spain 6 June 2012 Senate 50% (absolute) 237 1 0 15 June 2012 [16][41]
17 May 2012 Congress of Deputies 50% (absolute) 292 17 7 [16]
  Royal Assent Granted  
 Sweden1 30 May 2012 Riksdagen 50% 276 19 19 15 June 2012 [16]
 United Kingdom1 10 September 2012 House of Commons 50%         [42]
4 July 2012 House of Lords 50%       [42]
  Royal Assent   [42]

1 Not a member of the Eurozone.

 Ratification status

The amendment will enter into force on 1 January 2013, if all 27 EU member states have completed their ratification ahead of this date. As of September 27, only 4 countries still had an ongoing ratification process:

United Kingdom

The national approval process still needs to be completed with a Royal assent, which according to standard procedures is only a formality.[16]

Malta

The Foreign and European Affairs Committee approved on 2 July 2012, that the Maltese Prime Minister shall order an EU act amendment law (motion no.312), which in effect will ratify the “article 136 amendment treaty” for Malta, if it subsequently will be passed by a simple majority vote in the House of Representatives.[30][31] The upcoming debate and vote in the House of Representatives, has been scheduled for 1 October 2012.[43]

Czech Republic

The national approval process still needs to be completed with the Presidential assent of eurosceptic Václav Klaus.[16] It is speculated that he has decided to delay assent,[citation needed] and will let it depend on the outcome of the vote in the European Parliament scheduled for 25 October 2012[44] on a protocol giving the Czech Republic an opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as promised during the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon.[45][46]

Poland

The opposition to the government first submitted a draft bill on 11 January 2012, outlining that a constitutional ratification process with a 2/3 majority (66.7%) should be required for the ratification of the TFEU Article 136 amendment. This proposal was rejected on 10 May 2012 by a vote in Sejm,[47][48] and the ratification of the treaty was subsequently approved with a simple majority on 11 May 2012, where the vote in absolute terms recorded: 63.9% for, 33.7% against, 0.2% abstained, 2.2% not present.[34] The national ratification was completed by a presidential assent on 26 June 2012.[34] The deposit of instruments however still awaits the decision of the Polish constitutional court on a constitutional challenge of the ratification process.[49] Proceedings of the case (K-33/12) officially began on 1 August 2012, with the ruling expected to arrive between two to six months later.[50]

Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism

In addition to that amendment the European Stability Mechanism itself will be established by a treaty among the eurozone states: the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism. Formally, two treaties with this name were signed: one on 11 July 2011 and one on 2 February 2012. The second version was produced to “make it more effective”.[51] It is expected that only the 2012 version will be ratified by a sufficient number of member states. In August 2012, the 2012-version was forecasted to enter into force by September 2012.[52]

According to this treaty, the European Stability Mechanism will be an intergovernmental organisation under public international law and will be located in Luxembourg. It would be open to other members to join and would be led by a Board of Governors. Each state would appoint a governor and the board would either be chaired by the President of the Euro Group or by a separate elected chair from amongst the governors themselves.[9][52]

Ratification

Signatory Percent of
ESM contributions
Conclusion
date
Institution Majority
needed[15]
In favour Against AB Deposited[1] Ref.
 Austria 2.783% 4 July 2012 National Council 50% 126 53 0 30 July 2012 [53]
6 July 2012 Federal Council 50% 45 10 0 [54]
17 July 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [55]
 Belgium 3.477% 7 June 2012 Senate 50% 46 4 14 26 June 2012 [56]
14 June 2012 Chamber of Representatives 50% 90 14 24 [57]
20 June 2012 Royal Assent Granted [58]
 Cyprus 0.196% 31 May 2012 House of Representatives 50% 48 0 0 28 June 2012 [59]
15 June 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [60][61]
 Estonia 0.186% 30 August 2012 Riigikogu 50% (absolute) 59 34 6   [62]
11 September 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [63]
 Finland 1.797% 21 June 2012 Parliament 50% 104 71 24 29 June 2012 [64]
29 June 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [65]
 France 20.386% 21 February 2012 National Assembly 50% 256 44 131 2 April 2012 [66]
28 February 2012 Senate 50% 169 35 138 [67]
7 March 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [68]
 Germany 27.146% 29 June 2012 Bundestag 66.7% 493 106 5 27 September 2012 [25]
29 June 2012 Bundesrat 66.7% 65 0 4 [69]
13 September 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [70]
 Greece 2.817% 28 March 2012 Parliament 50% 194 59 0 10 May 2012 [71]
 Ireland 1.592% 20 June 2012 Dáil Éireann 50% 114 22 0 1 August 2012 [72]
27 June 2012 Seanad Éireann 50% 37 3 0 [73]
3 July 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [74]
 Italy 17.914% 12 July 2012 Senate 50% 191 21 15 14 September 2012 [75]
19 July 2012 Chamber of Deputies 50% 380 59 36 [76]
23 July 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [29]
 Luxembourg 0.250% 26 June 2012 Chamber of Deputies 66.7%[16] 49 5 0 31 July 2012 [77]
 Malta 0.073% 6 July 2012 House of Representatives 50% 65 0 0 19 July 2012 [78]
 Netherlands 5.717% 24 May 2012 House of Representatives 50% 100 47 0 13 July 2012 [79]
3 July 2012 Senate 50% 50 23 0 [80]
5 July 2012 Royal Assent Granted [81]
 Portugal 2.509% 13 April 2012 Assembly of the Republic 50% 204 24 2 4 July 2012 [82]
19 June 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [83]
 Slovakia 0.824% 22 June 2012 National Council 60% (absolute)[16] 118 20 5 29 June 2012 [84]
9 July 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [40]
 Slovenia 0.428% 19 April 2012 National Assembly 50% 74 0 1 30 May 2012 [85]
30 April 2012 Presidential Assent Granted [86]
 Spain 11.904% 17 May 2012 Congress of Deputies 50% (absolute) 292 17 7 2 July 2012 [87]
6 June 2012 Senate 50% (absolute) 234 1 0 [16][88]
  Royal Assent Granted  
 
Total of
ratified states
99.814% At least 90% required for entry into force of treaty 27 September 2012 [1]
  = States which have completed ratification of the treaty.

Ratification Status

Estonia

Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the Euro Group, stated on 27 September 2012 that Estonia was expected to finalize their ratification and join the ESM within a few days.[89]

Constitutional challenges

Austria

Three opposition parties in Austria (FPÖ, BZÖ and the Green Party) plan to launch a constitutional challenge against the Fiscal Compact, with the FPÖ also intending to challenge the ESM.[90] Constitutional Court President Gerhart Holzinger has said it could take three to six months for the court to deliver a judgement.[91] The Freedom Party of Carinthia, the largest party in the state assembly of Carinthia, has also announced their intention to challenge Austria’s ratification of the ESM.[92] No legal cases can be launched until the publication of the treaties in Austria’s official gazette which isn’t expected until their entery into force.[92] According to Holzinger, the court “cannot abolish the ESM pact but we would only establish that the agreement of this pact was unconstitutional”. If the court finds the ratification unconstitutional, Holzinger has stated that the government would have to “either defy the constitution by some means or other, or to negotiate after the fact with the other parties to the pact”.[92]

Estonia

The Estonian Chancellor of Justice concluded that Article 4(4) of the ESM treaty may violate the Constitution and cannot be ratified by Parliament in its present form.[93] The Chancellor demanded that the Government of Estonia re-open negotiations concerning the treaty. The matter was reviewed by the Supreme Court and a decision was rendered on July 12, 2012.[94][95][96] With a narrow 10-9 vote, the Court dismissed the application of the Chancellor and ruled that although Article 4(4) restricts the financial competence of the Estonian parliament, the principle of rule of law, and the sovereignty of Estonia, it does not breach the Constitution. The Court ruled that it is up to Parliament to decide whether Estonia accedes to the ESM.[97]

Germany

A large number of ordinary citizens, several members of parliament, and the Die Linke group in the Bundestag challenged the constitutionality of the ESM and petitioned the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe to issue a preliminary injunction prohibiting the President Joachim Gauck from signing and ratifying the treaty. The President declared that he would postpone his signature until the Court had ruled on the constitutionality of the ESM. If the Court rejected the injunction, the President would be allowed to sign and ratify the treaty. If the Court granted the injunction, the merits of the case would be decided while ratification remained on hold. If the Court decided that the treaty was unconstitutional, the treaty in its current form could not go into force.[98] The Court held oral arguments on 10 July 2012 and stated their intention to issue a verdict on 12 September 2012.[99] A group of German academics filed an appeal to the Constitutional Court requesting that the decision be delayed until the ECJ had issued a verdict on the legality of the treaty in the case referred to it by the Irish Supreme Court. While this could delay ratification by months, a spokesman for the court stated that “our understanding is that the court’s decision will go ahead on 12 September”.[100] After the European Central Bank announced their intention to buy unlimited amounts of government bonds from troubled ESM states, another court challenge was launched requesting that the court stop ratification until this decision is reversed.[101] While the court quickly rejected the case on procedural grounds, this didn’t rule out the possibility that the case could be refiled.[102]

On 12 of September the Court refused to issue an injunction, but imposed several conditions for ratification.[103] The argument that all future bailout deals handled by ESM will have to be individually approved by the German parliament was confirmed by the court.[104] However, the court found that the argument that the treaty might permit the ESM to borrow funds directly from ECB had no merit, as this would be incompatible with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.[105] Finally, the court also stipulated that Germany must attach a legal interpretative note to the instrument of ratification of the ESM treaty declaring that their liability is limited to the €190 billion committed in the treaty unless an increase is approved by the German parliament, and that the confidentiality of information by the ESM will not prevent the German parliament from being informed on the workings of the ESM.[105] Furthermore, the court stated that “Germany must express that it does not wish to be bound by the ESM Treaty in its entirety, if the reservations made by it should prove to be ineffective.”[105] On 27 September 2012, the eurozone countries adopted an interpretative declaration of the ESM treaty, making the “German interpretation” legally binding.[4] After a German court rejected a last minute appeal claiming that this declaration failed to satisfy the requirements which had previously been imposed, Germany completed its ratification of the treaty.[106]

Ireland

Thomas Pringle, an independent member of the Irish parliament, brought legal proceedings challenging the legality of the “ESM treaty” under both Irish and European Union law. On 9 July 2012, High Court judge Mary Laffoy decided that the “ESM treaty” violated neither EU nor Irish law. However she asked the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the legality of the possible ratification of the “ESM treaty” prior to the Council Decision amending Article 136 of the TFEU, which was planned to enter into force 1 January 2013 and intended to provide the intergovernmental “ESM treaty” with its legal basis within the EU law.[107] Mr. Pringle appealed the High Court decision to the Supreme Court. The appeal began in front of seven Supreme Court judges on 24 July 2012.[108] On 31 July 2012 the Supreme Court rejected Mr. Pringle’s constitutional challenge holding that the “ESM treaty” did not involve a transfer of sovereignty such that would require amending the constitution[109] (which can only be done by referendum), and on those grounds rejected Pringle’s application for an injunction to restrain the government from ratifying the ESM Treaty. The Surpreme Court however decided to refer these three questions regarding EU law to the European Court of Justice:

  1. Is the EU Council decision of 25 March 2011 (to amend Article 136 of the TFEU on 1 January 2013) valid?
  2. If so, is a member state entitled to join the ESM before the decision comes into force?
  3. Is the ESM Treaty compatible with EU law?[110]

As the Irish Supreme Court requested that the case be heard urgently, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) scheduled its hearing of the case already for 23 October 2012.[111] The Eurogroup statement from 14 September 2012 reflected expectations of a positive ruling by the ECJ and for the ESM to be officially founded and begin its lending operations by the end of October 2012.[112]

Poland

In Poland, members of the opposition party Law and Justice filed a constitutional complaint to the court on 26 July 2012, requesting that the bill ratifying the “TFEU Article 136 amendment” for Poland should be declared illegal, as it had only been passed with a simple majority and not the qualified majority of 2/3, which is required for the ratification of international treaties causing a transfer of political power to an international body.[49] Proceedings of the case (K-33/12) officially began on 1 August 2012, with the ruling expected to arrive between two to six months later.[50]

 

Distribution of contributions

  Germany (27.1464%)
  France (20.3859%)
  Italy (17.9137%)
  Spain (11.9037%)
  Netherlands (5.7170%)
  Belgium (3.4771%)
  Austria (2.8167%)
  Portugal (2.7834%)
  Finland (1.7974%)
  Ireland (1.5922%)
  Other (6.0587%)

The ESM is expected to have an authorised capital of 700 billion euros of which 80 billion is paid-in capital, and the remaining 620 billion -if needed- will be lended through the issuance of some special ESM obligations at the capital markets.[52] The ESM treaty foresees a payment of the capital in five annual instalments but the Eurogroup has stated on 30 March 2012 that capital payments shall be accelerated and all the capital paid by the first half of 2014.[113] The following table shows the part each member state has to pay following the ESM treaty.

ESM member
state
Percentage of
contributions
Paid-in capital
(million €)
Number of
shares
Capital subscription
(million €)
Nominal GDP 2010
(million US$)
Germany 27.1464 21,717.1 1,900,248 190,024.8 3,315,643
France 20.3859 16,308.7 1,427,013 142,701.3 2,582,527
Italy 17.9137 14,331.0 1,253,959 125,395.9 2,055,114
Spain 11.9037 9,523.0 833,259 83,325.9 1,409,946
Netherlands 5.7170 4,573.6 400,190 40,019.0 783,293
Belgium 3.4771 2,781.7 243,397 24,339.7 465,676
Greece 2.8167 2,253.4 197,169 19,716.9 305,415
Austria 2.7834 2,226.7 194,838 19,483.8 376,841
Portugal 2.5092 2,007.4 175,644 17,564.4 229,336
Finland 1.7974 1,437.9 125,818 12,581.8 239,232
Ireland 1.5922 1,273.8 111,454 11,145.4 204,261
Slovakia 0.8240 659.2 57,680 5,768.0 86,262
Slovenia 0.4276 342.1 29,932 2,993.2 46,442
Luxembourg 0.2504 200.3 17,528 1,752.8 52,433
Cyprus 0.1962 157.0 13,734 1,373.4 22,752
Estonia 0.1860 148.8 13,020 1,302.0 19,220
Malta 0.0731 58.5 5,117 511.7 7,801
Total 100.0 80,000 7,000,000 700,000 12,202,194

ESM will be authorized to approve bailout deals for a maximum amount of €500 billion, at the moment when ESM has received all its paid-in capital from the eurozone countries. The ESM lending capacity will be less in Q4 2012, but gradually increase with each of the remaining 4 capital payments scheduled for 2013 and the first half of 2014.[52]

Critics

Critics have noted that the ESM severely confines the economic sovereignty of its member states and criticise that it provides extensive powers and immunity to the board of ESM Governors without parliamentary influence or control.[114] Think-tanks such as the World Pensions Council (WPC) have argued that the European Stability Mechanism is the product of a short-term political consensus, and thus won’t be conductive of a durable, cohesive institutional solution. In their perspective, a profound revision of the Lisbon Treaty itself is unavoidable if Germany is to succeed in imposing its economic views, as stringent orthodoxy across the budgetary, fiscal and regulatory fronts will necessarily have to go beyond the treaty in its current form, thus further reducing the individual prerogatives of national governments.[115][116][117]

Estonia

In Estonia a group of MPs have called for a referendum on the treaty.[118] On 8 August, during the first reading of the bill ratifying the ESM in Riigikogu, the Estonian Centre Party put forward a motion to reject the bill. However, this motion was defeated in parliament by 56 votes against, with only 33 voting for.[119]

Germany

In Germany some members of FDP (liberal party) and CSU (conservative Bavarian party), both minor parties of the current government coalition, are against the European Stability Mechanism.[120] The Left, Pirate Party Germany and NPD also oppose the ESM, the latter comparing it with the Enabling Act of 1933.

Finland

Both opposition parties the True Finns and the Centre Party oppose the ESM.

France

Left Front and left wing presidential candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon[121] oppose the ESM.

Netherlands

The Socialist Party opposes the ESM. Geert Wilders Party for Freedom opposes any increase or systematisation of transfer payments, from the Netherlands to other EU countries, through means such as the ESM.

See also

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: European Stability Mechanism

References

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  120. ^ Welt:Liberale Euro-Rebellen haben fast 900 Unterschriften
  121. ^ Contre la ratification du « Mécanisme européen de stabilité financière »

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