Operation NorthwoodsFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Operation Northwoods memorandum (13 March 1962).
Operation Northwoods was a series of false-flag proposals that originated in 1962 within the United States government, and which the Kennedy administration rejected.  The proposals called for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or other operatives, to commit acts of terrorism in U.S. cities and elsewhere. These acts of terrorism were to be blamed on Cuba in order to create public support for a war against that nation, which had recently become communist under Fidel Castro. One part of Operation Northwoods was to “develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.”
Operation Northwoods proposals included hijackings and bombings followed by the introduction of phony evidence that would implicate the Cuban government. It stated:
“The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere.”
Several other proposals were included within Operation Northwoods, including real or simulated actions against various U.S. military and civilian targets. The plan was drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, signed by Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer and sent to the Secretary of Defense. Although part of the U.S. government’s Cuban Project anti-communist initiative, Operation Northwoods was never officially accepted; it was authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but then rejected by President John F. Kennedy.
According to currently released documentation, none of the operations became active under the auspices of the Operation Northwoods proposals.
[hide] 1 Origins and public release
3 Related Operation Mongoose proposals
5 See also
6 Further reading
8 External links
 Origins and public release
The main proposal was presented in a document entitled “Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)”, a top secret collection of draft memoranda written by the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The document was presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on 13 March 1962 as a preliminary submission for planning purposes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that both the covert and overt aspects of any such operation be assigned to them.
The previously secret document was originally made public on 18 November 1997, by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board, a U.S. federal agency overseeing the release of government records related to John F. Kennedy’s assassination. A total 1521 pages of once-secret military records covering 1962 to 1964 were concomitantly declassified by said Review Board.
“Appendix to Enclosure A” and “Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A” of the Northwoods document were first published online by the National Security Archive on 6 November 1998 in a joint venture with CNN as part of CNN’s 1998 Cold War television documentary series—specifically, as a documentation supplement to “Episode 10: Cuba,” which aired on 29 November 1998. “Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A” is the section of the document which contains the proposals to stage terrorist attacks.
The Northwoods document was published online in a more complete form (i.e., including cover memoranda) by the National Security Archive on 30 April 2001.
In response to a request for pretexts for military intervention by the Chief of Operations of the Cuba Project, Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, the document listed methods, and outlined plans, that the authors believed would garner public and international support for U.S. military intervention in Cuba. According to Jacob Hornberger:
The plan called for U.S. personnel to disguise themselves as agents of the Cuban government and to engage in terrorist attacks on the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay. It also called for terrorist attacks within the United States that would be conducted by pro-U.S. forces disguising themselves as Cuban agents.
One of the most fascinating aspects of Operation Northwoods involved the proposed hijacking of an American passenger plane. The JCS proposed that a real plane containing American passengers would be hijacked by friendly forces disguised as Cuban agents. The plane would drop down off the radar screen and be replaced by a pilotless aircraft, which would crash, purportedly killing all the passengers. Under the plan, the real passenger plane would be secretly flown back to the United States.
More specifically, the plan called for the following:
1.Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.
2.A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces. a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order): 1.Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
2.Land friendly Cubans in uniform “over-the-fence” to stage attack on base.
3.Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.
4.Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).
5.Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
6.Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
7.Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. Some damage to installations.
8.Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantanamo City.
9.Capture militia group which storms the base.
10.Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires—napthalene.
11.Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may be in lieu of (10)).
b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base. c. Commence large scale United States military operations.
3.A “Remember the Maine” incident could be arranged in several forms: a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba. b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to “evacuate” remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.
4.We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.
The terror campaign could be pointed at refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans en route to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement, also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.
5.A “Cuban-based, Castro-supported” filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14 June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space. “Cuban” B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with “Cuban” messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and “Cuban” shipments of arm which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach.
6.Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modifying an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from US resources in about three months.
7.Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.
8.It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner en route from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight. a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone. b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will begin transmitting on the international distress frequency a “MAY DAY” message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to “sell” the incident.
9.It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack. a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent Intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs. b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have disappeared. c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down, a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched and parts of aircraft found.
James Bamford wrote on Northwoods:
Operation Northwoods, which had the written approval of the Chairman and every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for innocent people to be shot on American streets; for boats carrying refugees fleeing Cuba to be sunk on the high seas; for a wave of violent terrorism to be launched in Washington, D.C., Miami, and elsewhere. People would be framed for bombings they did not commit; planes would be hijacked. Using phony evidence, all of it would be blamed on Castro, thus giving Lemnitzer and his cabal the excuse, as well as the public and international backing, they needed to launch their war.
 Related Operation Mongoose proposals
In addition to Operation Northwoods, under the Operation Mongoose program the U.S. Department of Defense had a number of similar proposals to be taken against the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro.
Twelve of these proposals come from a 2 February 1962 memorandum entitled “Possible Actions to Provoke, Harass or Disrupt Cuba,” written by Brig. Gen. William H. Craig and submitted to Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, the commander of the Operation Mongoose project.
The memorandum outlines Operation Bingo, a plan to; “create an incident which has the appearance of an attack on U.S. facilities (GMO) in Cuba, thus providing an excuse for use of U.S. military might to overthrow the current government of Cuba.”
It also includes Operation Dirty Trick, a plot to blame Castro if the 1962 Mercury manned space flight carrying John Glenn crashed, saying: “The objective is to provide irrevocable proof that, should the MERCURY manned orbit flight fail, the fault lies with the Communists et al. Cuba [sic].” It continues, “This to be accomplished by manufacturing various pieces of evidence which would prove electronic interference on the part of the Cubans.”
Even after General Lemnitzer lost his job as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still planned false-flag pretext operations at least into 1963. A different U.S. Department of Defense policy paper created in 1963 discussed a plan to make it appear that Cuba had attacked a member of the Organization of American States (OAS) so that the United States could retaliate. The U.S. Department of Defense document says of one of the scenarios, “A contrived ‘Cuban’ attack on an OAS member could be set up, and the attacked state could be urged to take measures of self-defense and request assistance from the U.S. and OAS.”
The plan expressed confidence that by this action, “the U.S. could almost certainly obtain the necessary two-thirds support among OAS members for collective action against Cuba.”
Included in the nations the Joint Chiefs suggested as targets for covert attacks were Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago. Since both were members of the British Commonwealth, the Joint Chiefs hoped that by secretly attacking them and then falsely blaming Cuba, the United States could incite the people of the United Kingdom into supporting a war against Castro. As the U.S. Department of Defense report noted:
Any of the contrived situations described above are inherently, extremely risky in our democratic system in which security can be maintained, after the fact, with very great difficulty. If the decision should be made to set up a contrived situation it should be one in which participation by U.S. personnel is limited only to the most highly trusted covert personnel. This suggests the infeasibility of the use of military units for any aspect of the contrived situation.”
The U.S. Department of Defense report even suggested covertly paying a person in the Castro government to attack the United States: “The only area remaining for consideration then would be to bribe one of Castro’s subordinate commanders to initiate an attack on [the U.S. Navy base at] Guantanamo.”
The continuing push against the Cuban government by internal elements of the U.S. military and intelligence communities (the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion, the Cuban Project, etc.) had already prompted President John F. Kennedy to attempt to rein in burgeoning hardline anti-Communist sentiment that was intent on proactive, aggressive action against communist movements around the globe. After the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy had fired CIA director Allen W. Dulles, Deputy Director Charles P. Cabell, and Deputy Director Richard Bissell, and turned his attention towards Vietnam. Kennedy had also stripped the CIA of responsibility for paramilitary operations like the Bay of Pigs and turned them over to the U.S. Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which, as Commander in Chief, Kennedy could more directly control. Personally, Kennedy expressed outrage to many of his associates about the CIA’s growing influence on civilians and government inside America, and his attempt to curtail the CIA’s extensive Cold War and paramilitary operations was a direct expression of this concern.
Kennedy personally rejected the Northwoods proposal, and it would now be the Joint Chiefs’ turn to incur his displeasure. A JCS/Pentagon document (Ed Lansdale memo) dated 16 March 1962 titled MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, 16 MARCH 1962 reads: “General Lemnitzer commented that the military had contingency plans for US intervention. Also it had plans for creating plausible pretexts to use force, with the pretext either attacks on US aircraft or a Cuban action in Latin America for which we could retaliate. The President said bluntly that we were not discussing the use of military force, that General Lemnitzer might find the U.S so engaged in Berlin or elsewhere that he couldn’t use the contemplated 4 divisions in Cuba.” The proposal was sent for approval to the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, but was not implemented.
(Some fifty years later when asked about the plot by journalist David Talbot, Robert McNamara drew a blank. “I have absolutely zero recollection of it. But I sure as hell would have rejected it,” McNamara said, adding, “I really can’t believe that anyone was proposing such provocative acts in Miami. How stupid!” )
Following presentation of the Northwoods plan, Kennedy removed Lemnitzer as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although he became Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in January 1963. American armed forces leaders began to perceive Kennedy as going soft on Cuba, and the President became increasingly unpopular with the military, a rift that came to a head during Kennedy’s disagreements with the service chiefs over the Cuban Missile Crisis.
On 3 August 2001, the National Assembly of People’s Power of Cuba (the main legislative body of the Republic of Cuba) issued a statement referring to Operation Northwoods and Operation Mongoose wherein it condemned such U.S. government plans.
 See also
Bay of Pigs Invasion
Body of Secrets
CIA Family Jewels
Cuba – United States relations
Proactive, Preemptive Operations Group
Shelling of Mainila
 Further reading
Jon Elliston, editor, Psywar on Cuba: The Declassified History of U.S. Anti-Castro Propaganda (Melbourne, Australia and New York: Ocean Press, 1999), ISBN 1-876175-09-5.
James Bamford, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency From the Cold War Through the Dawn of a New Century (New York: Doubleday, first edition, 24 April 2001), ISBN 0-385-49907-8. Here is an excerpt from Chapter 4: “Fists” of this book.
1.^ a b U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)”, U.S. Department of Defense, 13 March 1962. The Operation Northwoods document in PDF format on the website of the independent, non-governmental research institute the National Security Archive at the George Washington University Gelman Library, Washington, D.C. Direct PDF links: here and here.
2.^ Ruppe, David (May 1, 2001). “U.S. Military Wanted to Provoke War With Cuba”. ABC News. Retrieved January 21, 2012.
3.^ Zaitchik, Alexander (3 March 2011) Meet Alex Jones, Rolling Stone
4.^ “The Records of the Assassination Records Review Board,” National Archives and Records Administration.
5.^ “Media Advisory: National Archives Releases Additional Materials Reviewed by the Assassination Records Review Board,” Assassination Records Review Board (a division of the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration), 17 November 1997. A U.S. government press-release announcing the declassification of some 1500 pages of U.S. government documents from 1962–64 relating to U.S. policy towards Cuba, among which declassified documents included the Operation Northwoods document.
6.^ Jim Wolf, “Pentagon Planned 1960s Cuban ‘Terror Campaign’,” Reuters, 18 November 1997.
7.^ a b Mike Feinsilber, “At a tense time, plots abounded to humiliate Castro,” Associated Press (AP), 18 November 1997; also available here.
8.^ a b Tim Weiner, “Documents Show Pentagon’s Anti-Castro Plots During Kennedy Years,” New York Times, 19 November 1997; appeared on the same date and by the same author in the New York Times itself as “Declassified Papers Show Anti-Castro Ideas Proposed to Kennedy,” late edition—final, section A, pg. 25, column 1.
9.^ “National Security Archive: COLD WAR: Documents,” National Security Archive, 27 September 1998 – 24 January 1999.
10.^ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Appendix to Enclosure A: Memorandum for Chief of Operations, Cuba Project” and “Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A: Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba,” U.S. Department of Defense, circa March 1962. First published online by the National Security Archive on 6 November 1998, as part of CNN’s Cold War documentary series. “Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A” is the section of the Operation Northwoods document which contains the proposals to stage terrorist attacks.
11.^ “Episode 10: Cuba; Cuba: 1959–1968,” CNN (Cable News Network LP, LLLP).
12.^ “Cold War Teacher Materials: Episodes,” and “Educator Guide to CNN’s COLD WAR Episode 10: Cuba,” Turner Learning (Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.).
13.^ “Pentagon Proposed Pretexts for Cuba Invasion in 1962,” National Security Archive, 30 April 2001.
14.^ Hornberger, Jacob (2011-02-24) Don’t Northwoods Iran, Future of Freedom Foundation
15.^ Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A: Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba, p7, media.nara.gov, accessed 3 September 2009
16.^ Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A: Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba, p8, media.nara.gov, accessed 3 September 2009
17.^ Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A: Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba, p9, media.nara.gov, accessed 3 September 2009
18.^ Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A: Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba, p10, media.nara.gov, accessed 3 September 2009
19.^ Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A: Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba, p11, media.nara.gov, accessed 3 September 2009
20.^ a b c d e Bamford , James (2002). Body of secrets: anatomy of the ultra-secret National Security Agency. Random House. p. 82. ISBN 978-0-385-49908-8.
21.^ Mike Feinsilber, “Records Show Plan To Provoke Castro,” Associated Press (AP), 29 January 1998.
22.^ Lansdale Memo of 16 Mar 1962. This memo records a high-level meeting in the White House 3 days after McNamara was presented with Operation Northwoods. 
23.^ Brothers by David Talbot.
24.^ “Statement by the National Assembly of People’s Power of the Republic of Cuba,” National Assembly of People’s Power of Cuba, 3 August 2001; also available here.
 External links
See the above “References” section for documents cited in the body of this article.
The Full Operation Northwoods document in both JPEG and fully searchable HTML format.
High resolution scans from the National Archives, main pages: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Scott Shane and Tom Bowman with contribution from Laura Sullivan, “New book on NSA sheds light on secrets: U.S. terror plan was Cuba invasion pretext,” Baltimore Sun, 24 April 2001.
Ron Kampeas, “Memo: U.S. Mulled Fake Cuba Pretext,” Associated Press (AP), 25 April 2001.
Bruce Schneier, “‘Body of Secrets’ by James Bamford: The author of a pioneering work on the NSA delivers a new book of revelations about the mysterious agency’s coverups, eavesdropping and secret missions,” Salon.com, 25 April 2001.
David Ruppe, “U.S. Military Wanted to Provoke War With Cuba; Book: U.S. Military Drafted Plans to Terrorize U.S. Cities to Provoke War With Cuba,” ABC News, 1 May 2001.
“The Truth Is Out There—1962 memo from National Security Agency,” Harper’s Magazine, July 2001.
Chris Floyd, “Head Cases,” Moscow Times, 21 December 2001, pg. VIII; also appeared in St. Petersburg Times, Issue 733 (100), 25 December 2001.